1. In his essay “Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History,” Fr. Georges Florovsky states that the Christians of the early Church felt themselves as members of a community which transcended in a radical way the boundaries of race, culture or social rank that divide human beings. And in this sense, “from the very beginning Christianity was not primarily a ‘doctrine’, but exactly a ‘community’” (“One Body”, even “Body of Christ”), whose members were brethren to each other: By their baptismal profession of faith believers separated themselves from “this world.” They were unable to obey any polity, because “their true commitment was elsewhere.” The author furthermore asserts that when Christianity was established as the official religion of the Roman Empire, both “Churchmanship” and “Roman Citizenship” became identical, since “only Christians could be citizens.” The development of monasticism in the second half of
the fourth century A.D. under the Arianizing emperors was an immediate opposing response to the Empire. Or to put it more precisely, monasticism was an attempt to withdraw from Empire with its grand intentions to absorb everybody and everything, rather than an actual resistance. The lack of loyalty towards the Empire “was a vigorous reminder of the radical ‘otherworldliness’ of the Christian Church.” In turn, the Empire always saw this “new Exodus” as a challenge to its own plans, moreover, as a real threat to its own existence, starting with the times of St. Athanasius until the cruel persecution of the monks under iconoclastic emperors. 

Fr. Florovsky writes:

“Obviously, actual Monasticism was never up to its own principles and claims. But its historical significance lies precisely in its principles. As in the pagan Empire the Church herself was a kind of ‘Resistance Movement,’ Monasticism was a permanent ‘Resistance Movement’ in the Christian Society.”

2. These assertions of the distinguished Orthodox Christian thinker and church historian regarding the development of the monasticism in Constantine’s times as a way to resist the tendency of Church’s merger with the Roman Empire help me to provide a framework for better understanding the role of Paisii Velichkovskii (1722-1794) in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century. This was a church which Peter the Great (1672-1725) incorporated into the vast imperial project. The Spiritual/Ecclesiastical Regulation of January 25, 1721 instituted the Most Holy Governing Synod (Sviateishii Pravidiel’struiaushchii Sinod) as the highest governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was directly subject to the will and authority of the tsar. Until the end of the Saint Petersburg Empire (1917) the church will not be ruled by a patriarch and this period will be called somehow improperly “synodal.”

3. It should be stressed that Peter’s church reform was a break with the previous lack of clarity and precision which characterized the nature of the relationships between state and church in Russia. The possession of a large amount of land property gained during the Middle Ages had allowed the Church to enjoy a life parallel to the state. The highly privileged status of the Orthodox Church was also sustained by the fact that its most capable (though, as a rule, to use the incantation of the Psalmist, “devoid of pride and arrogance,” as was Filofei of Pskov, the creator of the doctrine Moscow the Third Rome) representatives provided the Russian state with an ideological support, especially after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The disappearance of the Byzantine Empire left Russia the only major independent Orthodox state and consequently isolated both politically and culturally on the European map. It seems that specifically the concept of “loneliness” (“lonely power”), which had been introduced in the Russian political and religious discourse at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century by the anonymous author of the earliest redaction of the Russian chronographia, gave birth to the ideology of eschatological hope, according to which Russia “will grow and will get younger and will rise […] and will expand till the end time.” Indeed, the people of the Middle Ages stayed true and consistent to their beliefs and because of this their allocations were very much convincing.

4. The approach towards the Church as a kind of “state within a state” contradicted the logic of the development of the autocratic system (samoderzhavnyi stroi). As a matter of fact, there can be no autonomy of the church in the framework of the autocratic system. An anointed tsar holds all the levers of power, he does not have to struggle for power over the church. That is, the Russian tsar stands both above the law and tradition. Therefore, in the seventeenth century the need for church reform became urgent.

Early in the century the quasi-autonomous position of the Russian Orthodox Church was challenged through the setting up of the Monastery Office (monastyrskii prikaz) which would ensure the state control over the economic power of the church. Thus, in 1601 (that is before the election and establishment of the new Romanov monarchical dynasty), the creation of such an office was the initiative of the popular forces under the rule of the landholders from the provinces. But the rather peculiar cohabitation of the two “great sovereigns” (velikie gosudari) – that is Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich (1596-1645) and his father Patriarch Filaret Nikitich (c. 1553-1633) (the latter dominating the former) – at the top of the emerging Russian absolutism put an end to the illusions of the first post-Smuta years. Patriarch Filaret was the one who had prevented almost any change as regards the untaxed church property, though the criticism was coming from all levels of the Russian society. In fact, under Philaret as an actual ruler of Russia the diocese of the patriarch (patriarshia obl’ast”) was expanded, thus strengthening the power of the patriarch.

Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1629-1676) would reluctantly re-establish the Monastery Office through Sobornoе Ulozhenie (Chapter 13). The law prohibited the church to acquire new land property (according to Chapter 42 Article XVII “On Patrimonies” (O votchikakh)). At the same time, the existing church and monasterial assets were transferred to the administration of the Monastery Office. The Monastery Office created according to the provisions of Sobornoе Ulozhenie was abolished by Tsar Fedor Alekseevich (1661-1682) in 1677.

Patriarch Nikon (1605-1681) succeeded to gain support from Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich in reshaping the liturgical tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, it might be assumed that in a sense the religious reform that
was carried out in the middle of the seventeenth century and which led to the establishment of the so-called post-
Nikonean church (the latter term is not historical), was not the reform of Nikon, but of the grecophile tsar. When
Nikon has been elected as a patriarch in 1652, the ideas for reform had already developed in the circle of the
cathedral protopopes (sobornye protopopy) and laymen (kruchok recnutelei blagochestviia) at the head of which was
the tsar’s confessor Stefan Vonifat’ev (? – 1656). It should be emphasized that the intended reform of Aleksei
provided the church with a certain degree of autonomy in order not to affect the prestige and authority of the
institution.

Nikon attempted to protect the church from state interference in the light of the principle that the secular
power is subject to the spiritual. To achieve this goal, he restored the title of the patriarch as a “great sovereign”
used by Patriarch Filaret and which had been changed to “great lord” (celikli gospodin; dominus) by the successor
of the latter, Patriarch Ioasaf I (? – 1640).  

The Great Church Council organized in Moscow in 1666–1667 can be called ecumenical because it was attended
by the Patriarch of Alexandria Macarius III (1647–1672) and Patriarch of Antioch Paisius (1657–1678). This was the first and
only time in Russia when the question of the relationship between state and church was raised in a church council. At the church council in
Moscow, the Greek prelates fundamentally recognized the primacy of secular power and affirmed the complete
dependence of the hierarchs on the tsar.  

5. Tsar Peter Alekseevich was aware that it was difficult for the entire Russian episcopate to renounce the theological and political tradition inaugurated by
Patriarch Nikon. This quiet attitude shared by the high church hierarchy can be perceived in the encyclical letter (okruzhnoe poslanie) “Exhortation to the flock”
(nveshchanie k pastve), consisting of 24 spiritual precepts, delivered in 1690 by the new Patriarch Adrian (1638–
1700). In his inaugural sermon, the head of the Russian Church defends the principle that the spiritual power possesses the primacy over the secular one, because “the
priesthood (sviashchenstvo) has authority both on earth and in heaven, for ‘whatever you bind on earth will be
bound in heaven’,” whereas “the tsardom has power only on earth.”  

Adrian’s opposition towards the so-called “European program” of the young tsar was mostly inoffensive,
though unambiguous. Despite this quietness, the intention of the tsar was to prevent any kind of church
resistance to his state reform efforts. Peter’s distrust in the loyalty of the church is explained by the fact that his
own authority could be, to a certain extent, superseded by the authority of the patriarch who was highly
influential in the Russian society. Without a doubt, Tsar Peter I was very well informed about the conflict
between his father Aleksei Mikhailovich and Nikon, who wanted to be as much as possible independent of the
tsar in ecclesiastical matters. A church governed by a patriarch could be a worthy opponent of the tsar’s
ambitions and enthusiasm. In regard to this issue, in the Ecclesiastical Regulation it is argued that “the common
people do not understand how the spiritual authority is distinguishable from the autocratic; but marveling at the
dignity and glory of the Highest Pastor, they imagine that such an administrator is a second Sovereign, a power
equal to that of the Autocrat, or even greater than he, and that the pastoral office is another, and a better, sovereign
authority.”  

6. The early eighteenth-century history of Russia has frequently been described in terms of transition. It is said that under Peter the Great, Russia has substantially
changed on political, military, and cultural levels and opened itself to the European world. I would say
(parenthetically) that – to a certain extent – this is a stereotypical approach, which descends from the
information campaigns employed by the Russian imperial court under the direct supervision of the tsar during the
long Great Northern War (1700–1721) to find a place for Russia in the European system of states (Staatsystem).
The claims of the diplomat Peter Pavlovich Shafirov (1669–
1739) in this sense are the most illustrative. Thus, in his propaganda writing on international law, A Discourse Concerning the just Causes of the War Between Sweden and Russia (Saint Petersburg, 1717), Shafirov affirms that before the war, in Europe the Russian people were not
considered Europeans, but meanwhile the perceptions have changed and there are countless attempts from the
farthest corners of the European continent to establish alliances with the Russian tsar.  

It is true that Peter’s reign seems to be dynamic and innovating in accordance with the bureaucratic theory of the European cameralism. This apparent dynamism
is backed by a considerable amount of instructions, regulations and statutes, which were produced with the
fervent participation of the tsar himself in order to change the mechanisms of state machine and to consolidate the
Romanov dynasty and in this way samoderzhavie. In the end, Peter’s Russian state appeared to be European,
though isolated diplomatically from Europe.

7. Recent research shows that the Great Northern War was one of the most important factors that influenced
church-state relations, specifically, that the war influenced the tsar to initiate religious reform. This is
because the state needed the resources of the church to solve foreign policy issues both at the military and
diplomatic levels. Other scholarship sheds even more light on the beginnings of the Petrine church
reform, a topic which was somehow neglected by the previous historiography. Thus, it has been observed by
the method of comparative historical analysis that it was during the trips of 1692–1693 to the White Sea (to
the dioceses of Northern Russia – Vologda-Belozersk
and Ustiug-Tot’ma) when Peter I had realized that the church had significant land, commercial, monetary and human resources. Consequently, it has been suggested to consider the period 1696–1703 as the first stage of the Petrine church reform.23

Indeed, it would be safe to assume that the novelty of Peter’s religious reform consists not in the Westernization (zapadnichestvo) of the church, but in the secularization. The reform started on January 24, 1701, when it was re-established the Monastery Office under the lay supervision of the count Ivan Alekseevich Musin-Pushkin (c. 1660–1730); on January 31, 1701, it was issued another decree stipulating the transfer of all the church and monastical properties under the administration of the Monastery Office.

8. Tsar Peter I saw church reform as one of his supreme responsibilities. He believed that this reform is a godly work of the monarch concerned about fulfilling his Christian duty. This view is expressed in the Manifesto of January 25, 1721, when the Ecclesiastical Regulation has been issued, as follows:

“Among the many cares derived from the obligation of our God-given authority concerning the reform of our nation and of other states subject to us, we have given consideration also to the clergy. Perceiving in it much disorder and great deficiency in its affairs, we have experienced in our conscience a not unfounded fear that we appear ungrateful to the All-High if, having received from Him so much good success in reforming not only the military class but likewise the civil service, we should neglect the reform also of the ecclesiastical estate. And when He, the impartial Judge, asks from us a reckoning concerning this great commission entrusted to us by Him, let us not be without reply.”24

As a matter of fact, the right of the autocrat to carry out all the necessary changes in the administration of the state, i.e., the autocratic power (samoderzhavnaia elast’), is conceptualized by Peter in the Military Articles of 1715, which constituted the first military criminal code in Russia. Thus: “His Majesty is an autocratic monarch who does not have to answer to anyone in the world. But he, as a Christian sovereign, has the power and authority to rule his own states and lands according to his own will and goodwill.”25 This is the first definition of the unlimited power of the sovereign in the Russian legislation.

The Ecclesiastical Regulation was written by bishop of Pskov and Narva Feoden Prokopovich (1681–1736), one of the Russian imperial court’s most influential ideologues during the latter part of the reign of Peter I.

Strictly speaking, the Ecclesiastical Regulation was not properly a law, being conceived as a political pamphlet, which was suffused with a vehement critique of the situation in the church. It also had not been approved by an actual church council (sobor), though the table of contents of its first edition (Saint Petersburg, September 16, 1721) implies that the “Spiritual Synedrion or Synod, that is the Synodal Government of the Church Affairs (sobornoe dukhovnykh del pravitel’stvov) was established “with the permission and agreement (po soizvoleniiu i prigovoru) of the all-Russian spiritual estate and Governing Senate.”26

In Peter’s view, the establishment of a new collegial system of the church administration under the scrutiny of the monarch instead of patriarchate would impede tension between the secular and religious authorities.27

In the Ecclesiastical Regulation, it is clearly stated that a synodal administration of the church will ensure peace within society, whilst the nation (otchestvo) should be afraid of rebellions and disturbances caused by an independent ecclesiastical administrator.28

It should be stressed that in essence the establishment of a collegial system of the church administration was not anti-canonical. From a historical perspective, the principle of synodal administration within the church was characteristic to the church of the times of the Apostles. Perhaps for this reason the Eastern patriarchs did not express disagreement with the institution of the Holy Synod in Russia.

To avoid generating schism (raskol) within international Orthodoxy, in the letter of September 30, 1721, Peter asked the Patriarch Jeremias III of Constantinople to approve the replacement of the patriarchate with the Most Holy Synod. The tsar also informed the patriarch about the conclusion of the Nystad Peace Treaty (August 30, 1721), thus implying the change of international status of Russia as a new empire.29

In his response of September 23, 1723, Jeremias III approved the establishment of the Holy Synod, which is “our brother in Jesus Christ” and “has the right to do and establish the same as the four apostolic holy patriarchal sees.” On the same day, the Russian Holy Synod was acknowledged by the Patriarch of Antioch Athanasius III Dabbas.30

9. From the very beginning of Christianity in Russia, the center of the cultural life was the monastery. We can say that monasteries arose from the religious needs of the people. It was not created any kind of congregations with certain political goals.31

The belief of the Russian people that through the prayers of the monks the Russian land is being saved was alien to Tsar Peter. His attitude towards Christian asceticism was negative and he thought that any inactivity and uselessness in human and social life found its most blatant expression in monastic life.32 This viewpoint is outlined in a kind of historical introduction to the decree of January 31, 1724, “On the monastic rank, on placing retired soldiers in monasteries and on the establishment of a seminary and hospitals” (O zvanii monasheskom, ob opredelenii v monastyri ostavnykh soldat i ob uchrezhenii seminarii i gospitaleta). Thus, according to Peter, Russia
is generally unsuitable for monasticism, because the northern climate of the country does not allow monks to fulfill their spiritual mission. They must work for their food or someone else must do it for them. The first monks stayed in Palestine, Egypt, Africa and “other very warm places and had enough natural vegetables for food besides human labor”; thus, “apart from books, they did not need clothes or churches, [...] however, they worked with their own hands.” Afterwards, the bigot Byzantine monks began to build monasteries not in the desert, but in the cities and “demanded financial assistance for this imaginary shrine,” and “when the Turks besieged Constantinople, they could not even find six thousand people” for the defense of the city. Furthermore, the decree states that hypocrisy “began to spread among Russian monks under the protection of the church superiors (edinovlastnikov tserkovnykh).” Reference is made to the provisions of Sobornoe Ulozhenie of 1649, which stopped excesses by prohibiting the purchase of new land property. And what they [the monks] say – they pray, then everyone prays [...]. What is the benefit to society from this? Only the old proverb is true: neither to God nor to people. In conformity with the decree of January 31, 1724, monasticism was supposed to disappear. The latter was necessary only for the appointment of the bishops (dilia arkhiereista) in accordance with the established custom, although it has been subtly remarked that in the first three centuries of Christianity bishops were not appointed from among monks. Secondly, hospitals and seminaries were required to be opened at the ancient monasteries.

10. The prohibitive decrees of the early 1720s undermined the position of the monasteries in Russia. At the same time, some of the Petrine monastic regulations became somehow obsolete after the tsar’s death since there was no mechanism to enforce binding. However, this is not to imply that somehow monastic life escaped state control during the entire synodal period.

The state control over the church was strengthened by the ecclesiastical reform of Catherine II, which started with the Manifesto of February 26, 1764 “On the secularization of church dominions” (Manifest o sekularizatsii monastyirkh zemel’). It should be noted that despite the unfavorable policies towards the church, Catherine resisted the temptation to indulge the calls of the radical representatives of her government to dissolve monasticism.

Such view was expressed by the key figure of the church reform, Grigorii Aleksandrovich Potemkin (1739–1791), who was a member of the Holy Synod and Commission consisting of the representatives of laity and clergy (Ulozheennaja kommissija), which was entrusted to resolve the issue of the ecclesiastical land ownership. In the recently discovered memorandum On monasteries (O monastyrakh) (dated 1786, but clearly connected to the political activity of the 1760s), Potemkin claims that monasticism appeared in Russia “neither in honor of the law, nor in favor of people, for our people, adding to the existing at that time rudeness bigotry and hypocrisy, were a source of false miracles and harmful doctrines,” but nevertheless they “did not allow Russia to share the fate of the Greeks.” Furthermore, it is said that the way the monasteries are organized does not correspond to the interests of the society, that is: “the contempt of the world does not depend on vows [...]; we consider that a gathering of monks is a gathering of parasites; this is an example of temptation and an association [that leads to] confusion”; “all monasteries in the cities, and especially in Moscow, should be destroyed as being unsuitable for [the life in] solitude; they should be turned into schools or hospitals for poor and elderly officers and soldiers, easing the church statute (ustae), but ensuring cleanliness and decency.”

11. It might be assumed that Raskol removed from the historical process that small but powerful part of the Russian society which would have been able to resist the strengthening of samoderzhavie and the excesses of the religious reforms of Tsar Peter and his successors. At the same time, the Old Believers freed the Russian Church from the ecumenical aspirations of Patriarchs Filaret and Nikon, who were adherents of the Byzantine tradition. Or, as the Christian philosopher V. V. Zen’kovskii points out, the devotees of the Old Belief (starina) crushed the ecclesiastical dream of a “sacred kingdom,” thus “liberating the Church’s creative energies, which had been captured by an ecclesiastical-political theme.” In other words, when at the Moscow Church Council of 1666–1667, the Eastern patriarchs – at the request of Aleksei Mikhailovich – declared the supremacy of temporalia over spiritualia and, moreover, when the ecclesiastical administration became a part of the imperial administration under Peter Alekseevich, the Church ceased to be an ideological pillar of the state.

Vasili Znenkovskii observes that the lack of serious opposition of the high Orthodox hierarchy towards the church reform of Peter the Great should not necessarily be explained by its obsequiousness. It would be too simplistic to interpret things in this way. According to the author, the main cause of this phenomenon was a deep change in the religious consciousness, which made the ecclesiastical circles to perceive the state power as “an alien sphere” (inorodnaja, chuzaia diia sebia sfera). Thus, the secularized state power “corresponded to (or interacted with) a new ecclesiastical consciousness (tserkovnoe soznание), which yielded to external power precisely because it was external and spiritually alien. The sphere of the Church was the sphere of inner life; its relationship to secular power touched the periphery but not the essence of ecclesiasticism (tserkovnost’).”

13. The freedom gained by the Church as an outcome of this cultural crisis was used for addressing the
purely church themes and monasticism was one of the main among them. As it has been shown, the issues of monastic property and monastic way of life were under constant pressure of the secular power. Moreover, by the middle of the seventeenth century, the monasteries became devoid of learned monastics, as the secular culture (which was not by definition rival; it was simply different) started to flourish. Consequently, the Russian monasticism of the second half of the eighteenth century is characterized by the intense theological pursuits.

One of the most prominent figures of the eighteenth-century Orthodox monasticism was Paisii Velichkovskii. His name is related to the revival of the hesychast tradition in Russia, which was known in the Kyivan Caves Monastery in the eleventh-twelfth centuries, also by Sergius of Radonezh (1314-1392) and his disciples and disappeared after the movement of non-possessors (fourteenth — beginning of the sixteenth century) and especially Nil Sorskii (1433-1508). Bringing the forgotten tradition of ascetic contemplation and prayer back into the damaged monasticism of the synodal church, Paisii, in fact, revived the Russian monasticism in accordance with the mystical teachings of the Eastern Orthodox writers.37

It is important to emphasize this latter aspect, because the other ascetic writer of the eighteenth century, Tikhon of Zadonsk (1724-1783), was very much influenced by the German Lutheran theologian and mystic Johann Arndt (1555-1621). On the other hand, the Russian Freemasons (for example, the aristocrat I. V. Lopukhin (1756-1816), who was a very influential mystic at the imperial court) popularized at least in the two capital cities of the Empire the mystical-ascetic writings of other Western authors according to the “non-denominational” principle.42 Perhaps the most important writings translated and published at the initiative of the Freemasonry of this era are the following: Guía espiritual que desembaraza al alma y la conduce por el interior camino para alcanzar le perfecta contemplación y el rico tesoro de la interior paz (Rome, 1673) by the Spanish mystic Miguel de Molinos (1628-1696)43 and Explication des maxims des saints sur la vie intérieure (Paris, 1697) by the Catholic archbishop François Fénelon (1651-1714).44

In the letter to Theodosius, the archimandrite of Sophroniev Hermitage, Paisii Velichkovskii expressed both joy and fear about the upcoming publication of his translations from the Fathers of the Church and other ancient Christian authors. The joy was caused by the fact that this literature will not be consigned to endless oblivion. At the same time, Paisii says that being addressed only to monks, this corpus of texts, falling into the hands of the laymen without any guidance on Jesus Prayer, could only cause harm (prelest’) to them and hence the blasphemy from their side.45

As Fr. Pavel Khondzinskii points out, the fears of Saint Paisii were most likely unjustified since for the most part the Slavonic Philokalia (Dobrotoľubie) was not accepted by laity. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, Fénelon’s asceticism and doctrine of “pure love” was more known and used in Russia, because “it was not truly clear how instructions written for the ancient inhabitants of the desert can be correlated with the life of a person living in a modern cultural environment.”46

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Notes

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3. Florovsky, “Empire and Desert,” 139.
5. Florovsky, “Empire and Desert,” 146.
8. In fact, Russia and the conglomerate of petty Georgian principalities and kingdoms were the only Orthodox countries that
maintained their independence after the Ottoman conquest of Eastern Europe and transcontinental region of Caucasus.


10. It should be mentioned that the ownership of land and properties by the Orthodox Church started to be restricted by secular power since the time of Ivan III (1440–1505). Under Vasiliy III (1479–1533), the most significant discussion of the sixteenth century took place among Russian monastics on issues of ascetism in monastic life. Thus, the question of the church properties was raised at theoretical level by the representatives of possessors (Josephites) and non-possessors. Then the claims were made about whether monasteries were needed at all. Furthermore, the church-territorial councils (церковно-земские соборы) of 1580 (assembled by Tsar Ivan IV) and 1584 forbade the acquisition by monasteries of new land property. These decisions had no results. Cf. Л. В. Черепнин, Земские соборы русского государства в XVI–XVII вв. [L. V. Cherepnin, The Russian Assemblies of the Land in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries], vol. 2 (Москва: Языки славянской культуры, 2013), 120–131. See also Donald Ostrowski, “The Moscow Councils of 1447 to 1589 and the Conciliar Period in the Russian Orthodox Church History,” in Taftery of Russian Christianity: Studies in History and Culture, ed. Nickolas Lupini, Donald Ostrowski, Jennifer B. Spock (Columbus, Ohio: Department of Slavic and East European Languages and Cultures and the Resource Center for Medieval Slavic Studies, The Ohio State University, 2016), 144–147.

11. On the issue of the impact of the sociopolitical upheavals (Московский мятеж of 1648 against the growing taxation and the revolt of the Ukrainian Cossacks under the hetman Bohdan Khmel`nytsky) on the religious matters in the middle of the seventeenth century see Paul Bushkovitch, Religion and Society in Russia: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 56–57.

12. The historical term “патриаршайа облѧсть” can be translated literally as patriarchal dominion or territory, but more properly as the diocese (епархия) of the patriarch: it included those cities with their districts (уезды) that were under the direct church administration of the patriarch as a diocesan bishop. Cf. П. Ф. Николаевский, Патриаршее область и русские епархии в XVII веке [P. F. Nikolaevskii, The diocese of the patriarch and Russian eparchies in the seventeenth century] (Санкт-Петербург: Типография Ф. Елеонского, 1888), 4.


15. Талина, Выбор пути, 357. After Nikon became a patriarch in 1652, he started to sign as “Bozhieiu milostiui velikii gosudar` i gospodin...”.


17. Г. В. Есиюров, Расколычины въ XVIII столетія [G. V. Esiyrov, Issues of the religious schism (raskol) in the eighteenth century], vol. 2 (Санкт-Петербург: Типография Общественная польза, 1863), 76.


19. [П. П. Шафиров], Разсуждение, какие законные причины его царьского величеству к началию войны против Кафы 12, короля святого, в 1700 году [P. P. Shaferov, A discourse on what legitimate reasons did His Royal Majesty have for starting the war against Charles 12, King of Sweden, in 1700?] (Санкт-Петербург: 1717), 2.


26. П. П. Пекарский, Наука и литература в России при Петре Великом [P. P. Pekarskii, The science and literature in Russia in the time of Peter the Great], vol. 2 (Санкт-Петербург: Общественная польза, 1862), 590–520.

27. See Ecclesiastical Regulation, 9: “When an administrative college is under the Sovereign Monarch and has been established by the Monarch, it is evident here that the college is not some faction, constituted through secret association for the sake of its own interests, but individuals assembled for the general welfare by the command of the Autocrat and under his scrutiny, jointly with others.”

28. Ecclesiastical Regulation, 10: “This is highly significant: The fatherland need have no fear of revolts and disturbances from a conciliar administration such as proceed from a single, independent ecclesiastical administrator.”

29. Original Russian text is inserted in Павел Верховский, Учреждение Духовной Коллегии и Духовный Регламент. К вопросу об отношении Церкви и государства в России [Pavel Verkhovskoi, The establishment of the Spiritual Collegium and Spiritual Regulation. On the issue of the relationship between Church and state in Russia], vol. 1 (Ростов на Дону: Гуман, 1916), 678–679.

30. Both charters have been published several times, but I cite from Полное собрание постановлений и распоряжений по ведомству православного исповедания Российской Империи [Complete collection of decrees and orders regarding the Department of the Orthodox Confession of the Russian Empire], vol. 3 (Санкт-Петербург: Синодальная типография, 1873), 160–162. See also Николай Писсис, “The Image of Moscow Patriarchate in the Eastern Church: Status and Legitimacy,” in Russia’s Early Modern Orthodox Patriarchate, vol. 1, Foundations and Mitred Royalty, 1539–1647, ed. Kevin M. Kain, David Goldfrank (Washington: Academica, 2020), 66.


33. Н. А. Воскресенский, Законодательные акты Петра I [N. A. Voskresenskii, Legislative acts of Peter I], vols. 2–3 (Москва: Дрекхернаплише, 2020), 439.

34. Воскресенский, Законодательные акты, 424.

35. Воскресенский, Законодательные акты, 439.

36. Воскресенский, Законодательные акты, 440.

37. Воскресенский, Законодательные акты, 437.


41. Zenkovsky, History of Russian Philosophy, 50.

42. In fact, as Paul Bushkovitch has argued, it was around 1500 when the role of the monk in the fundamentally monastic medieval Russian Orthodox Church began to become less important. It seems that at this time the monasteries “have reached a peak of influence as well as material prosperity” and their decline was accompanied by the rise of the bishops. Cf. Bushkovitch, Religion and Society in Russia, 10. To my judgement, the gradual decline of the monasterial culture meant the decline of the traditional Russian Orthodoxy (starina), the pursuit for which has led to the civil war of the middle of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, it would be hard to associate the development of culture with the episcopal sedes.


46. [Мигель де Молинос], Духовный путеводитель, служащий к отвлечению души от чувственных вещей и к приведению
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