



COLONISTS, RULERS, SAVIORS: PHILO-GERMANISM WITHOUT GERMANS

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Abstract: Drawing on Cristian Cercel’s 2019 contribution *Romania and the Quest for European Identity: Philo-Germanism without Germans*, the present article pursues the creation of Romanian philo-Germanism following the 1989 Romanian Revolution in the paradoxical absence of the German minority, which all but disappeared during the early ‘90s; the arguments follow an ethnic group which evolved from being an agent of colonial power in the late Middle Ages to becoming an agent of transnational capital in postcommunist times. Additionally, the article discusses the inflated importance of the German civilizational model as a cure for the perceived shortcomings of a semi-peripheral nation for which self-colonialism, imitative capitalism, brain drain, and labor extractivism were seen as the only conceivable ways of preventing demotion to the status of periphery following the revolution. Lastly, the different manifestations of this cultural stance are represented, as well as how sympathy towards one minority was gradually institutionalized and practiced on a large scale to the detriment of others, chiefly the Hungarians and the Roma, in a case of revived nationalism and ethnocentrism *on behalf* of the vanishing Germans.

Keywords: philo-Germanism, ethnocentrism, *Ostsiedlung*, European identity

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The German presence in Romania has always represented a controversial topic in Romanian historiography. Seemingly light-years away in terms of cultural building blocks, the German model – through all its renditions: the Saxon, the Swabian, the Zipser, the Landler¹ – occupies a significant position in Romanian imagology, having managed to outlive even the French model, which during the 19th century seemed it will forever shape the way in which the young Romanian state accessed and partook in European culture.

A recent volume dealing with the topic is Cristian Cercel’s *Romania and the Quest for European Identity. Philo-Germanism without Germans*.² The 2019 contribution to the field of Southeast European studies occasions a very fertile discussion about the seemingly paradoxical Romanian sympathy for its German minority and undertakes a historical analysis

of the Romanian-German relationships and the shifting status of the German minority in Romania. The book consists of seven chapters, but their succession allows for possible permutations, in that they function both within the overall structure and internal logic of the book *and* as independent contributions. This is why my arguments will sway back and forth, engaging with the different topics addressed in the book as an attempt to convey the gist of it and elaborate on each particular subtopic rather than to dryly summarize its contents. After an introductory chapter focusing on present-day manifestations of philo-Germanism – to which I will return in due time –, chapters two and three focus on the early historical developments and the role of German “colonists” sent to the furthest reaches of Europe in the 12th century – the so-called *Ostsiedlung* –, namely Transylvania, Bukovina, Dobruja, and Wallachia, in order

to instate a strong work ethic, to protect the civilized West from barbaric attacks, and ultimately to civilize the East itself.³ Hence the building of fortified churches or *Burgkirchen*, a symbol for everything the German colonists would come to encapsulate in the Romanian collective memory: a protestant penchant for resilience, communitarian spirit, and not least sacrifice for the greater good, kindly rewarded with tax exempts and political privileges. The latter translated into a particular stance taken in regard to the surrounding Romanian population, for which the German minority was, de facto, a form of provincial aristocracy: a world within a world, intangible and seemingly vastly superior. Unsurprisingly, for most of the history of living on common grounds, the Romanian population was not politically represented, as the Hungarian and German ethnics in Transylvania took precedence. But the question of political priorities and political consciousness in the region took shape during the early 19th century, as the Ottoman and the Russian Empire grew in political relevance and military power and represented a real threat to the very European ideal. The renewed protective role played by Saxons as flagbearers of European culture found expression in their discourse about the self and as a form of contempt for the neighboring Other. As Cercel notes, “Saxon authors tended to play up ‘the importance of Saxons in Transylvania’ while also asserting Saxon superiority over the other ‘nations’ in Transylvania and particularly over the Wallachs, who were in effect not a legally recognized ‘nation.’”⁴

This repeated discourse of supposed Saxon superiority ultimately seeped into the self-discourse of Romanians as well, ending up as a form of “self-Orientalism.”⁵ The second-class Romanians developed a sense of inherent inferiority, which they ultimately accepted as the natural order of things. This is how the causal relationship between colonization and underdevelopment came to be known, in that the colonists presumably stumbled upon an utterly barren landscape, and it was only their positive influence that turned things around. In this regard, Friedrich Engels unwillingly gave voice to a peculiar paradox and a classic “chicken and egg” situation in 1848, when talking about how “[t]he Germans in Poland have obstructed the formation of Polish cities with a Polish bourgeoisie; they have burdened the centralization efforts, the most powerful political instrument for the rapid development of a nation, through their foreign language, through their isolation from the Polish population, through their thousand various privileges and municipal constitutions.”⁶ Read “Transylvanian” in lieu of “Polish” and the truth value of Engels’ quote is not significantly altered. The historical distance and the sources’ bias in favor of the civilizing mission begs the question as to what was first: the Romanian underdevelopment or the colonists declaring it. An overbearing cultural presence with its own bureaucratic

ethos, much like the observer of quantum particles, cannot possibly *not* influence the observation of reality. So that this deprecating rhetoric cladding the form of self-Orientalism is a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially since in 1848, as Transylvanian serfdom was abolished, it was not followed by impropropriation and redistribution of land assets,⁷ so that the impoverished peasants could not compete with their former lords, the wealthy land-grabbing elite, despite being technically free; in a paradoxical twist, serfdom seemed to be less exploitative than the free market, as noted by Manuela Boatcă and Ioana Parvulescu:

“In Transylvania, the agrarian reforms of 1848 were followed by the patents of 1854, which abolished serfdom and confirmed peasants’ property rights by offering former serfs small parcels of land. But the reforms had limited effects. Peasants who had not been serfs were excluded from the land offerings, and those who did receive land often could not sustain themselves of the small plots they owned and continued to work as hired hands for landowning nobles or wealthy peasants. The land owned by emancipated serfs was also generally too fragmented to be used efficiently.”⁸

The similarities with contemporary discourses regarding the importance of German investors are uncanny, as we shall see further, when discontent with the status quo is framed as maladjustment to the new socio-economic realities.

After a long, winding, but absolutely necessary historical preamble, Cercel then comes nearer to the present time in investigating the manner in which, during the 19th century, “the liminality and in-betweenness”⁹ of the Romanian Principalities was resolved through a fundamental choice that would reverberate over the entire ensuing history of Romania. The struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire through the Russo-Turkish War (the War of Independence of 1877–78, as it is better known in Romanian historiography) was followed by German rule in the two Principalities of Wallachia and Bessarabia, leading to a form of German imperialism in Southeastern Europe, which started with the rule of Prince Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (later King Carol I of Romania) and effectively ended as Michael I was removed from power at the conclusion of the Second World War.

During the late 19th and early 20th century, the relationship followed the same dichotomy, whereby Romanians were depicted in their clear inferiority to the Saxons. Even political representatives meant to preserve a high degree of interethnic and interfaith diplomacy, such as Friedrich Müller-Langenthal, the bishop of the Evangelical Church of Transylvania, fell victim to the same representations. This led to the formation of a sort of argument regarding “the greater good of German influence,” used successfully as early as the 19th century



in order to combat what was perceived as the overbearing influence of French culture, as Andrei Terian shows.¹⁰ In much the same vein, in Bessarabia, the German argument was used in order to fight Bolshevism during the 1920s;¹¹ an alliance with the German minority was seen as capable of opposing Socialism, and the German capitalist ethos presumably provided a higher level of wellbeing as communism.¹²

Political commentary aside, not even literature was spared these underlying stances but rather took on a more pronounced note while hiding under the pretext of literary convention. Cristian Cercel dedicates an entire chapter, “The Self and the Other,” to comparative ethnic representations throughout Romanian-German literary production, chiefly drawing on Adolf Meschendörfer’s and Heinrich Zillich’s works. Cercel illustrates the depth of these positions by discussing Adolf Meschendörfer’s 1931 *Die Stadt im Osten*, which is filled with exoticizing and Orientalizing tropes regarding Romanians, who are depicted as downright barbarians and “appear only as exotic and marginal figures, who threaten the Transylvanian Saxon high culture and civilization of Kronstadt.”¹³ Unsurprisingly, both Adolf Meschendörfer and Heinrich Zillich, respected interwar German authors in Romania, had clear and substantiated connections with right-wing institutions. Immediately after the war, the communist regime took retaliatory measures for the de-Nazification of cultural institutions and of the entire cultural environment. However, the end of the war brought new conservative impetus within the German minority groups in Romania, as proven by the establishment of *Landsmannschaften* – homeland associations, breeding conservative, ethnocentric stances under the guise of anti-communism, since communism was depicted as an oriental, barbaric invention. On the basis of the postwar deportation of German ethnics to labor camps in Siberia and other locations in the Soviet Union, the initial function fulfilled by the colonists in the 12th century onwards, that of presumably holding off against barbarity, was reactivated, prompting authors such as Hans Bergel to bemoan “the increasingly more evident loss of the genotypical feature of Saxons, namely the Western European-Occidental component, that is gradually disappearing in favor of the Eastern European-Balkan [sic.] one.”¹⁴

There are three discernible strategies in the development of postwar Romanian-German identity. The first one consists of defending Germanness against the barbarity of this “Balkan genotype,” the second is to flee it by leaving to Germany – as Hans Bergel himself did – and to express conservative positions with ease against the backdrop of West-German freedom of speech, and the third one is, of course, to reconstruct the Romanian-German identity from scratch, while taking into account the shifted political circumstances and taking a stance against the “German frog”¹⁵ of ethnocentrism and against

völkisch representations; this latter position was mostly adopted by left-leaning members of the *Aktionsgruppe Banat*.¹⁶ Whereas the first discursive strategy is by no means defensible, even by the most philo-German of intellectuals, the second one, involving the act of leaving Romania during the communist period, has been intensely ideologized following the revolution and mostly used to further an anticommunist agenda. Cercel deconstructs the entire hypocrisy imbedded in framing the pre-89 migration to Germany as a heroic subversion driven solely by abstract aspirations towards freedom and the wish to escape state socialism. He shows how this policy has repeatedly been portrayed as morally degrading “human trafficking” enacted by the socialist state which, in exchange for each Romanian citizen of German ethnicity allowed to exit the country, received financial compensation from West Germany. No mention whatsoever, remarks Cercel dryly, of Romanian citizens who did not enjoy the opportunity of being “trafficked” in the name of freedom and human rights. In other words, a specifically German privilege was framed as an instance of victimhood.

But the real extent of the philo-Germanism without Germans is visible only following the Romanian Revolution of 1989 and the ensuing policies regarding national minorities. Cercel investigates, in comparative manner, the fate of three ethnic minorities with a significant cultural and symbolic signature on Romanian public space, namely the Roma, the Hungarian, and ultimately the German minority. 1990 saw the establishment of the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania [Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien], the representative body of the German minority, whose initial role was that of representing the interests of individual German ethnics in the region. But in the first two years after the revolution, 150.000 German ethnics left for Germany. The Forum was initially meant to represent them domestically instead of helping them emigrate and was not designed to mitigate the bestowal of visas but to help protect the rights of those remaining.¹⁷ Repeated political rhetoric during the 1990s emphasized the importance of progressive policies in regard to Romanian national minorities in trying to paint the picture of a tolerant, all-inclusive, truly European nation abroad, but this promise was never actually fulfilled. The reassessment of national identity following the revolution brought with itself extensive debates on the role of minorities and the hypothetical “threat” they posed to national sovereignty. An anti-Hungarian paranoia in response to in-existent separatist claims on Transylvania and, at the same time – and similar to the Polish rendition of “antisemitism without Jews”¹⁸ – the “philo-Germanism without Germans” took shape, most clearly seen in the varying degree of openness towards representative bodies for different national minorities: “the German

state opened consulates in Sibiu and Timișoara as early as 1990, whereas the Hungarian consulate in Cluj-Napoca opened only in 1996,”¹⁹ informs Cercel. Postponing the establishment of a Hungarian embassy is either attributable to anti-Hungarian positions in regional politics (the rampant nationalism of Gheorghe Funar, who served as Cluj-Napoca’s mayor between 1992 and 2004, is engrained in collective memory) or helps show how the representation of Hungarians was deprioritized in comparison to that of Germans, or that both nationalism and philo-Germanism were at play. In any case, the contrast in the behavior of Romanian authorities towards German and Hungarian minorities is even more striking given that the Hungarian ethnic group in Cluj-Napoca was significantly larger than the Saxon minority in Sibiu or Timișoara during the ‘90s.

In the post-89 history of “othering” minorities, the good Other was the civilizing German, while the bad Other was the oriental Roma, whose century-long slavery was ignored and downplayed even after 1989, as a historical reckoning seemed inevitable.²⁰ The last chapter of the book, borrowing its title from a newspaper article from that time, “The Rich Villages around Sibiu and Brașov Have Been Invaded by the Gypsy Migration,” is illustrative of how the migration of ethnic Germans gave rise to anxiety regarding their possible replacement through the Roma, an extremely racist assumption meant to emphasize the superiority of one ethnicity – embodying the civilized West – over the Orientalized Other. Their juxtaposition shows how “anti-Gypsism is often a key component of Romanian philo-Germanism and of Romanian attempts to assert a European identity.”²¹ Another aspect is that Romanian migration to the West, unlike the German one, was widely regarded as a migration of Roma beggars, thieves, the Lumpenproletariat, etc., who supposedly gave Romanians a bad reputation; this state of affairs could be amended only by strengthening Romanian-German economic relationships and fighting against this issue together. Similarly, the emigration of Saxons during the communist time and the question of how to deal with their lodgings brought about, following the Revolution, an entire discourse drawing on ethnic hierarchies among Romanian minorities, whereby the Roma’s relocation to Saxon dwellings was seen as a measure taken in the name of poorly understood equality and wrongful administration of the German cultural heritage by the communist authorities, meant, in fact, to annihilate German identity, as “Germans allegedly Europeanize and Occidentalize Romania; Roma de-Europeanize and Orientalize it.”²²

Establishing German embassies across Romania was not the only political statement meant to institutionalize the sympathy of Romanian authorities towards their German minority and towards the German state. The German-Romanian Treaty on Friendly Cooperation of

1992 in effect portrayed the German minority as “a both historical and contemporary (collective) subject capable of actively bringing a positive contribution to Romanian society, as long as the necessary conditions are created,”²³ as Cercel argues. And which seem to be these necessary conditions? Well, not unlike in the distant, “colonizing” past, it would seem that this positive contribution is unlikely to take place without the help and support of local authorities, which mustn’t necessarily translate to downright fiscal incentives, but to an unquestioned trust in the benevolence of German corporations. Within this context, the success of German- and Austrian-owned businesses in Romania has often taken on the form of exploitation, land grabbing,²⁴ and labor extractivism, as nearly all labor conflicts were framed as a refusal to acknowledge the invariably positive, visionary, progressive, good-natured entrepreneurship of foreign investors. The German businesspeople presumably strive towards the implementation of a civilizing capitalism in an economic system they deem flawed due to state control, corrupt administration, and a penchant for strikes.

Cercel then goes on to show how, under the guise of preserving the German heritage in the Transylvanian region, the lobby in favor of German-language education in Romania – since mastering German is seen as a status symbol more than the ubiquitous English or the waning French – actually aims at maintaining a sufficient pool of qualified German speakers who can be employed locally by German businesses at a fraction of the cost, regardless of ethnicity. The underlying message of the Friendship Treaty, made possible by The Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, was that the encouragement of German entrepreneurship in Romania would aid Romanian integration efforts into the European Union and that Germans in Romania are intrinsically closer to Europe and to the ideals embodied by the European project than Romanians are. The takeaway is, as Cercel puts it, that “contemporary Romanian philo-Germanism is a self-Orientalized and self-colonized assertion of a yearning for Europe.”²⁵ The author goes deeper in analyzing the media discourse regarding the presence and impact of the German community on Romanian public life in recent years and mentions several of the success stories presented in the national press regarding the remaining Saxon or Swabian ethnics, who opened businesses and thus were said to provide models for their Romanian counterparts, usually in conjunction with the preservation and touristification of German heritage under “the guise of authentic Saxonness, which is actually reinvented for the sake of a specific touristic market,”²⁶ at the same time contributing to gentrification, commodification, and unequal access to cultural patrimony. The intensively desired German return to Romania is seen as a panacea for Romanian economic backwardness while signaling



a traditional capitalist encroachment, hence the title of one of Cercel's chapters, drawing on and adapting a common Romanian saying, "They who have no Germans, should buy some."

In conjunction to this philo-German discourse driven by economic interests, another one was taking shape in the public sphere, one regarding the victimhood of Romanian German ethnics during the communist regime and especially in its early stages, as they were deported to Soviet labor camps for the "reconstruction" of the Soviet Union under the pretext of collective guilt. The president of the German Forum, Paul Philippi, addressed this victimhood in 1995 without making any reference to the convoluted history of the support of Romanian Germans for Nazism, nor to the persecution of Jews and the Roma, even going as far as to claim that "Romanian Germans who served in the SS and those who were deported to the Soviet Union should also be regarded as 'victims of National Socialism.'"²⁷ This outlandish claim, corroborated with the accusation of "human trafficking," constructs a narrative not only of resistance and stoic heroism, but also of a victimhood deserving of symbolic compensation in the form of generalized esteem, institutional support, and not least the acknowledgement of the Germans' civilizing role in Romania's history.

This brings us back to the book's first chapter, "Only another German can jolt us out of our eternal boycotting of history," where Cercel opens his philo-German argument with the historical moment when a "foreigner," i.e., somebody belonging to an ethnic minority, managed to enter the highest circles of Romanian politics and become president. In 2014, the former mayor of Sibiu, Klaus Iohannis, an ethnic German, became a candidate in the presidential election on behalf of the National Liberal Party – after having represented the German Forum for his entire career as mayor – and won against Victor Ponta, a member of the Social Democratic Party. The sympathy amassed by Iohannis prior to his initial election, as well as his subsequent reelection in 2019 – as he was faced against yet another representative of the Social Democratic Party, Viorica Dăncilă – owed partly to his symbolic capital amassed as longstanding mayor of Sibiu, seen as a beacon of German identity in Transylvania, but also to his cultural standing as member of the Saxon community. He embodied the ideal of a politician who is as clean from politics as possible, i.e., from *Romanian* politics, and whose talent was channeled into administration as an *apolitical* field. His ability as so-called technocrat had been substantiated in 2007, as Sibiu was awarded the title of European cultural capital and its popularity skyrocketed, especially since 2007 was

also the moment when Romania entered the European Union. On the other hand, Iohannis' credentials shone brighter against those of his opponents. The 2000s and early 2010s were riddled with distrust, disdain, and downright hatred towards the Social Democratic Party, seen as responsible for everything gone amiss in Romanian society and an example of Balkan politics at its worst, representing "everything Iohannis and Romanian German elites present themselves as being the opposite of: corruption, mismanagement of funds, politicking and politics."²⁸ This period saw the convergence of several interlinking phenomena, the most visible of which was gerontophobia, as the older generations were regarded as harvesting a "communist"²⁹ mindset reluctant to progress and voting with the Social Democrats. The second one, arguably the most socially impactful, was anti-statism, corroborated with a distaste for social protection policies, as the state was seen as "the 'fattie' of national economy [...] who needs to lose weight,"³⁰ in the infamous words of former Romanian president Traian Băsescu, who effectively enacted severe cuts in the state budget in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. All things considered, the very fact that the political opponents of Klaus Iohannis were associated with this party made a comparison between the two ways of doing politics inevitable, and with it a comparison between the presumably European, civilized, dignified, etc. Saxon candidate Iohannis and the "petty," "Balkan" "upstarts" Ponta and Dăncilă.

From a distance, it seems that the German settlers from the present-day territory of Romania have come full circle: from distant "colonizers" to vilified Nazis and ultimately to colonizers again, sent not from the centrality of Empire, but returning from the Germany to which they left shortly after 1989 and, as Cercel shows, bringing with them the enlightened, civilizing capitalism the Romanian periphery so urgently needs. I will conclude by citing what I consider to be one of the clearest articulations of contemporary philo-Germanism, namely that, more than just a simple yearning for Europe,³¹ "Romanian philo-Germanism looks like the expression of the anti-communist liberal-conservative marriage underlying contemporary understandings of European identity that either tend to belittle fascism while scapegoating communism as the root of all evil or tend to put the equal sign between the two."³²

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Notes

1. Which is not dismiss the different ethnic denominations as indistinguishable, but rather to point out their relative evenness in terms of how they are perceived by the Romanian population.
2. Cristian Cercel, *Romania and the Quest for European Identity: Philo-Germanism without Germans* (London & New York: Routledge, 2019).
3. Christian Lübke, "Ostkolonisation, Ostsiedlung, Landesausbau im Mittelalter. Der ethnische und strukturelle Wandel östlich von Elbe und Saale im Blick der Neuzeit," in *Ostsiedlung und Landesausbau in Sachsen. Die Kührener Urkunde von 1154 und ihr historisches Umfeld*, ed. Enno Bünz (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008), 467-484, 469.
4. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 37.
5. Infesting different generations and intellectuals with different pedigrees, from Ienăchiță Văcărescu and Dinicu Golescu to Nicolae Iorga. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 39. Although the concept of "Self-Orientalism" sits close to that of the "self-colonizing metaphor," formulated by Alexander Kiossev, it is preponderantly employed in conjunction to the far East in describing how cultures such as Japan and China transform Orientalism into a form of marketing capital. The closest geographical anchoring of the concept referred to the relationship between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Haris Dervišević, "From Orientalism to Self-Orientalism in the Bosnian Context," *Žnakovi vremena - Časopis za filozofiju, religiju, znanost i društvenu praksu* 89/90 (2021):139-155. Whereby self-Orientalism was a byproduct of Orientalism imposed by the Empire unto its colony rather than a consciously curated cultural export.
6. "Dafür haben die Deutschen in Polen die Bildung polnischer Städte mit polnischer Bourgeoisie verhindert; sie haben die Zentralisation, das gewaltigste politische Mittel zur raschen Entwicklung eines Landes, durch ihre verschiedene Sprache, durch ihr Ab-schließen von der polnischen Bevölkerung, durch ihre tausendfach verschiedenen Privilegien und städtischen Rechtsverfassungen erschwert." Friedrich Engels, "Die Polendebatte in Frankfurt. From 'Neue Rheinische Zeitung,' Nr. 70/ August 9, 1848," in *Karl Marx. Friedrich Engels. Werke Band 5*, ed. The Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1959), 319-363, 321.
7. David Prodan and Katherine Verdery, "The origins of serfdom in Transylvania," *Slavic Review* 49.1 (1990): 1-18, 12.
8. Manuela Boatcă and Anca Parvulescu, *Creolizing the Modern: Transylvania across Empires* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2022), 30. See also Cornel Ban, "Inter-imperiality: A Political Economy Reading," *Transilvania*, no. 10 (2022): 15-22. <https://doi.org/10.51391/trva.2022.10.02>.
9. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 44. This is a concept anticipating Manuela Boatcă's and Ioana Parvulescu's use of "interimperiality," designating "the constant tension between Habsburg, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian imperial formations as inter-imperial rivalries" (Boatcă and Parvulescu, *Creolizing the Modern*, 10.) in the historical region of Transylvania, a concept borrowed, in turn, from Laura Doyle. See Laura Doyle, *Inter-imperiality: Vying Empires, gendered labor, and the literary arts of alliance* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020).
10. Andrei Terian, "National Literature, World Literatures, and Universality in Romanian Cultural Criticism 1867-1947." *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 15.5 (2013): 11.
11. As the Bolsheviks' rise to power overturned all the privileges of the German colonists in the newly established Soviet Union and even occasioned anti-German excesses in certain regions. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion*, vol. 46 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 30.
12. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 58.
13. *Ibid.*, 55.
14. *Ibid.*, 64.
15. The expression was used to designate the social pressures enacted on the individual within the ethnically homogenous and socially self-sufficient Swabian communities depicted in Herta Müller's works. Thomas Cooper, "Herta Müller: Between myths of belonging," in *The exile and return of writers from East-Central Europe: A compendium*, eds. John Neubauer and Borbála Zsuzsanna Török (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 475-496, 480.
16. Ovio Olaru, "Ethnocentrism by Proxy. The Ideological Triangulation of Romanian-German Literature," in *Beyond the Iron Curtain. Revisiting the Literary System of Communist Romania*, eds. Ovio Olaru, Ștefan Baghiu, and Andrei Terian, (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2021), 193-214, 203-204.
17. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 78.
18. Alina Căla, "Antisemitism Without Jews and Without Antisemites," in *Jewish Studies at the Central European University 2002-2003*, eds. Eszter Andor and András Kovács (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003), 39-51. <https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-857>
19. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 82.
20. One of the obstacles was, of course, the fact that the Romanian Orthodox Church itself had been a slave-owning institution in the past; this, coupled with the overwhelming public trust in the Church, meant that addressing this issue publicly could bring about political disapproval.



21. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 148.
22. *Ibid.*, 150.
23. *Ibid.*, 83.
24. For case studies on land grabbing practices in Romania, including that of the infamous Austrian companies Holzindustrie Schweighofer and Bardeau Holding GmbH, see Constantin Ciutacu, Luminița Chivu, and Vasile Jean Andrei, "Land grabbing: A review of extent and possible consequences in Romania," *Land Use Policy* 62 (2017): 143–150.
25. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 40–41.
26. *Ibid.*, 142.
27. *Ibid.*, 105.
28. *Ibid.*, 90.
29. A result of Russophobia and unnuanced anticommunism following the 1989 Romanian revolution.
30. ***, "Traian Băsescu: 'Omul gras' din sectorul bugetar trebuie să slăbească în continuare," *Stirile ProTV*, 27.04.2013, <https://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/politic/traian-basescu-omul-gras-din-sectorul-bugetar-trebuie-sa-slabeasca-in-continuare.html> [15.03.2023]. See also Cristian Cercel, "Romania under Basescu: Aspirations, achievements, and frustrations during his first presidential term," *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 6 (2012): 1138–1140.
31. Which could easily be fulfilled by mimicking closer models; there is a very valid question here regarding the failure of the French model to garner an esteem similar to the German one after the Romanian revolution.
32. Cercel, *Philo-Germanism*, 169.

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